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VIEWPOINT

Marketing Pharmaceuticals
A Constitutional Right to Sell Prescriber-Identified Data?
Lawrence O. Gostin, JD

P

HARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES HAVE STRONG ECO nomic interests in influencing physician prescribing behaviors. They advertise directly to consumers
and to physicians. Beyond general marketing,
manufacturers promote their drugs to physicians through
“detailing”—sales representatives (“detailers”) visiting
medical offices to persuade physicians to prescribe their
products.
By law, pharmacies receive specific information with
every prescription, including the physician’s name, the
drug, and the dosage. Pharmacies sell these records to prescription drug intermediaries (data miners), who use
advanced computing to analyze prescriber-identified information (which physicians prescribe what drugs, in what
dosages, and with what prescribing patterns). Data miners,
in turn, lease sophisticated reports to pharmaceutical companies to refine detailers’ marketing tactics, armed with
knowledge about physician prescribing practices—for
example, who are high or low prescribers and early or late
adopters of new drugs.
Detailing raises vital health policy questions, including
its effects on clinical decision making (safety, quality, and
cost) and the patient-physician relationship (privacy and professionalism). Yet private companies claim a First Amendment right to buy and use prescribing data for product marketing. The tensions between privacy and commercial speech
have deep implications for public health regulation.

Commercial Speech:
The Future of Public Health Regulation
In 2011, in Sorrell v IMS Health, the Supreme Court struck
down Vermont’s prescription confidentiality law, which, absent the physician’s consent, prohibited the sale of prescriberidentifying information as well as the disclosure or use of
that information for marketing purposes.1 Justice Kennedy’s 6-3 majority opinion held that Vermont’s law is subject to “heightened scrutiny” (a demanding level of judicial review) because the act restricts speech based on who
the speaker is (marketers) and the content of the message
(prescription data).
The First Amendment’s core purpose is to safeguard discourse in social affairs (politics, culture, and religion). For
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most of the nation’s history, the Supreme Court said that
the Constitution afforded no protection for commercial
speech—broadly defined as speech by a commercial enterprise for business purposes. By 1975, when the Court first
recognized a constitutional right to market products, commercial speech was viewed as “lower-value” expression.2
The Roberts Court, however, has progressively increased
protection for commercial speech, culminating in Sorrell’s
“heightened scrutiny,” which is a rigorous standard of
review for all “content and speaker-based” speech.
The standard for reviewing regulation of health information is critically important. The Court traditionally uses a
“mid-level” 4-part test laid down in Central Hudson Gas v
Public Service Commission3: Is the message lawful and nondeceptive? Does the state have a “substantial interest” in
curtailing the speech? Does the regulation “directly
advance” that interest? Is the regulation “no more extensive than necessary?” Justice Breyer, dissenting in Sorrell,
called for an even lower standard of review reserved for
“mere economic regulation” that only incidentally affects
speech. He observed that prescriber information exists
only because the state requires reporting those data. Consequently, Breyer urged judicial deference to reasonable
legislative judgments.
The prospect of enhanced judicial scrutiny casts a shadow
over regulation of health information, including food, drugs,
alcohol, and tobacco—almost all of which is speaker and
viewpoint based. In today’s complex informational environment, government restricts the health claims that companies can make and compels the inclusion of safety warnings.4 Pharmaceutical companies must provide information
about a drug’s risks and adverse effects and cannot promote off-label use of their products. If the Supreme Court
uses a heightened standard of review, these public health
regulations, and more, will be placed at risk.
A federal court recently found, for example, that the US
Food and Drug Administration may have violated the First
Amendment by requiring graphic images on tobacco packaging. The Supreme Court, moreover, has already used
heightened scrutiny to invalidate California’s ban on violent video games to deter youth violence.5
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The Lower-Value Content of Detailing
Detailer sales calls may benefit some physicians who learn
useful information and receive generous product samples.
Yet the source of medical information is vital. Detailers’ primary goal is to sell more brand-name products rather than
to educate physicians by providing objective scientific evidence. Some physicians may rely on these accounts rather
than delving into the peer-reviewed medical literature. The
informational deficits resulting from detailing could pose
health and safety risks, increase health care costs, and affect
privacy and professional practice.
Patient Health and Safety. Although most physicians
recognize detailers’ self-interest, sales calls significantly
alter prescribing practices. 6 Physicians may prescribe
medications that are not needed or that are newly marketed without an adequate safety record. Detailing, for
example, increased Vioxx and Baycol prescriptions before
these drugs were withdrawn from the market because of
inordinate safety risks.
Health Costs. Pharmaceutical companies spend billions
of dollars on detailing, primarily for brand-name patented
drugs for which prices are higher. The detailers’ aim is to
convince physicians to prescribe their products and add them
to hospital formularies. Generic drug manufacturers, in contrast, engage in far less marketing, leading to an informational imbalance that contributes to driving up health care
costs. Studies point to the savings that would be generated
by the increased use of generics and suggest ways to incentivize physicians to prescribe generics.7
Patient Privacy. Prescriber information is not usually considered a privacy concern because patients are not personally identified. However, theoretically, cross-matching prescriber information with multiple databases could reveal a
patient’s identity, although there are no reported instances
of this occurring.8 Consequently, companies that possess prescriber records must ensure the privacy and security of potentially identifiable patient data.
Professionalism. Because privacy traditionally safeguards patients rather than health care professionals, prescriber-identified information is not usually thought of as
a privacy invasion. Yet sales visits designed to influence treatment are professionally intrusive, interfering with the patientphysician relationship. Although physicians can opt out of
detailing, the presence of private marketing in physician offices is common, which could potentially undermine physician objectivity and impartiality.
Regulation in a Post-Sorrell Environment
Although Sorrell’s heightened scrutiny poses considerable
challenges, government could find creative ways to regulate drug detailing. Existing laws in Maine and New Hampshire probably will be invalidated, but more than 25 additional states have proposed detailing regulations. The Court
offered states pathways to constitutionally viable laws, ironi788
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cally by enacting more systematic restrictions on prescriber information.
Vermont’s law permitted prescriber information to be
disclosed for health care research, compliance, education,
or law enforcement. The Court said that these broad
exceptions showed that Vermont was not truly interested
in protecting privacy. The courts would probably uphold
future laws if states more uniformly restricted prescriber
information, with narrow exceptions such as for health
care research.
Even absent strict regulation, states could significantly reduce detailing by informing physicians of their right to opt
out or by requiring an “opt in,” which would affirmatively
require physician consent to sales visits. For example, the
American Medical Association launched its Physician Data
Restriction Program in 2006 to allow prescribers to opt out
of having their prescription information shared.
Rather than restricting the use of prescriber-identified information, states could increase the information available
to physicians. For example, states have supported “academic detailing” or “counterdetailing” to inform physicians about generic and lower-cost alternatives to brandname pharmaceuticals. The Supreme Court views more
information in the marketplace as constitutionally preferable to restricting information.
Although “more” information may be constitutionally preferred, it is nearly impossible for public health agencies to
match the marketing resources of private businesses. Companies spend countless billions of dollars to influence consumer purchasing decisions throughout the marketplace.
Consequently, there remains an important role for public
health regulation, such as restrictions on marketing potentially harmful products, disclosure of health and safety risks,
and instructions for safe use.
Whether the product is intended to promote health
(vaccines, drugs, or medical devices), poses hidden risks
(food or alcohol), or is inherently dangerous (tobacco),
government has a solemn responsibility to ensure fair and
balanced health information rather than leaving consumer
safety to an unregulated private market.
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